Nearly five years after the 2021 coup, Myanmar’s generals are pushing ahead with multi-phase elections under the 2008 military-drafted constitution. ANFREL’s assessment report, Myanmar Junta’s Planned Elections: Falling Short of Democratic Legitimacy (September 2025), concluded that these polls will unfold amid widespread violence, mass displacement, and the systematic denial of basic freedoms, and therefore cannot meet international standards for genuine, democratic elections.¹

Myanmar Junta’s Planned Elections: Falling Short of Democratic Legitimacy

The junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC) was installed after the arrest of pre-coup commissioners, and is now organising elections that rely on dubious voter lists, opaque advance voting, untested electronic voting machines, and a tightly controlled party system dominated by military allies.²

At the same time, research with Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand by Burma Affairs and Conflict Study (BACS) shows overwhelming rejection of the planned polls and deep fears that international recognition would further entrench military rule.

This Data Dive issue maps four key dimensions of the junta’s election project: where voting will (and will not) take place; how the newly enacted Election Protection Law criminalises dissent; why there is no real choice for voters; what Myanmar’s migrant workers are saying and how overseas communities are resisting pressure to legitimise the process.

A “nation-wide” election that skips large parts of the nation

The junta’s Union Election Commission (UEC) has announced that the first phase of elections will take place on 28 December 2025 in 102 townships, and the second on 11 January 2026 in 100 townships. A third phase may take place on 25 January, although it has yet to be confirmed. These plans are built on a legal framework that sets no minimum voter turnout, no minimum territorial coverage, and no requirement that voting happen simultaneously nationwide.

In practice, that means the junta can organise polls in limited areas of the country under its control while still claiming a valid “national” election. On 5 December, the UEC said no voting would be held in 2,931 wards and village tracts – around 17% of all basic administrative units, in addition to the 56 townships previously excluded.³ Many of these areas are those hardest hit by armed conflict and displacement.

The map below, produced by Myanmar media DVB, illustrates in which areas the junta’s elections will take place, and where they have been cancelled.⁴

The Election Protection Law: “Protecting” the election by jailing its critics

On 29 July 2025, the junta enacted a sweeping “Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic General Elections from Obstruction, Disruption, and Destruction”, widely known as Election Protection Law. The law criminalises almost any criticism of or “interference” with the election, with a minimum three-year prison term and, in some cases, harsher penalties going up to the death penalty.

Since its adoption, the law has been used to sentence young people to decades of hard labour for putting up boycott stickers, arrest film directors and artists over simple social-media reactions, and charge journalists, student activists, and members of ethnic armed organisations.¹⁰

On 3 December, activists in Mandalay staged an anti-election protest. In retaliation, junta troops reportedly destroyed dozens of shops in Zaycho market, while authorities  announced a 20 million kyat (around USD10,000) reward for information leading to the activists’ capture.¹¹

Rather than ensuring peaceful, competitive elections, the Election Protection Law is being deployed to silence dissent, deter protests, and block independent scrutiny – turning any form of election monitoring into a criminal risk. 

The Illusion of Choice: Fifty-seven parties on the ballot, one heavily favoured

ANFREL’s assessment shows how party competition has been engineered to guarantee military dominance in the next parliament: fifty-seven parties appear on the ballot, but one (the military-supported Union Solidarity and Development Party) is heavily favored by the legal framework and the junta’s institutions.¹⁶ Only  six parties are registered at the Union level, while the remaining 51 can run only in a single state or region.¹⁷ 

Every registered party has been screened and approved by the junta-appointed UEC, with most candidates widely seen as pro-military, co-opted, or dependent on the regime. Under the new registration rules, 57% of the parties that ran in the 2020 general election no longer exist, even though they received more than 70% of votes and 90% of seats.¹⁸ Even some initially pro-junta figures have been removed from the playing field, with parties dissolved despite claiming to meet formal requirements and prominent leaders disqualified on technicalities. The military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has fielded over one-fifth of all phase-1 candidates, with dozens of constituencies already effectively uncontested.¹⁹

On paper, voters see a long list of party logos; in reality, meaningful opposition has been banned, jailed, or forced underground. What remains is managed pluralism: an election designed to look competitive and introduce some token diversity in the next parliament while ensuring the military’s continued grip on power.

Migrant and Overseas Myanmar Voters: Pressure, Boycott, and the Struggle for Legitimacy

The RESPECT Myanmar study by BACS, released in late 2025 and summarised in their media briefing, draws on extensive qualitative research with Myanmar migrants in major Thai cities such as Bangkok, Mae Sot, Chiang Mai, Samut Sakhon and nearby industrial areas.²³ Across interviews and focus groups, migrants consistently recall the 2020 general election as a meaningful, largely free contest in which they participated enthusiastically as voters, volunteers and community organisers, with real hope for change.²⁴

By contrast, almost none of them intend to take part in the junta’s 2025 polls, which they describe as a “show” or “trap” designed to prolong the conflict and legitimise the generals.²⁵ Respondents reject the military council’s claim to be a government, viewing it instead as an armed group that seized power and continues to commit abuses; their support flows, often critically and pragmatically, toward democratic actors, labour groups and organisations that provide practical assistance.²⁶ Migrants stress their vulnerability – precarious legal status, risk of arrest or deportation, and dependence on employers and brokers – which makes them easy targets for pressure to register or vote, yet they remain clear that their real priorities are protection, legal status and a genuine democratic transition, not a staged vote that ignores their experiences.²⁷

Myanmar has opened 50 overseas polling stations at its embassies, permanent missions, and consulates to allow advance voting for the junta-organised 2025 multiparty general election, and officials say that advance balloting has already been completed at 41 of these locations as of 8 December 2025.²⁸ Embassies have announced staggered voting windows – for example, 29 November–1 December in Egypt, and 1–4 December in Chiang Mai followed by 6–7 December in Bangkok for Thailand, which hosts the largest Myanmar migrant population.²⁹

In parallel, ANFREL’s briefings and media reports highlight a pattern of cross-border intimidation: in South Korea, migrants have reported receiving phone calls urging them to vote and being threatened with denial of consular services like passport renewal if they don’t comply; inside Myanmar, university students were forced to cast advance ballots as a condition of enrolment, while internally displaced people and aid recipients face threats of losing food rations, shelter or financial aid if they refuse.³⁰

Activists describe these tactics as coercive and a violation of host-country sovereignty, insisting that “voting is a right – but not voting is also a right,” and many migrants and exiles in Thailand, including former Civil Disobedience Movement members, openly pledge to boycott the polls despite embassy pressure.³¹ Official census data lists around 1.12 million Myanmar citizens abroad, nearly 70 percent of them in Thailand, but excludes millions in conflict zones and undercounts irregular migrants; civil society groups estimate that up to 5 million Myanmar nationals may now be in Thailand alone.³² This makes overseas voting – and the overwhelming refusal of migrants to legitimise the junta’s election – a central battleground in the struggle over political legitimacy.

Conclusion – Elections Staged by Junta, Not a Democratic Mandate

Taken together, the evidence in this Data Dive reinforces ANFREL’s assessment that the elections staged by the Myanmar junta do not comply with international standards and cannot be free, fair, credible, or legitimate. They will take place in an environment of widespread violence, restrictive laws, and intense repression, in which fundamental freedoms of assembly, association, expression, and information are systematically curtailed. Large parts of the country will not vote at all and others will see only limited polling as there are no minimum requirements for territorial coverage or voter turnout. Within this framework, the junta’s political party registration law and electoral system ensure that only handpicked political parties remain on the ballot, while those that once commanded genuine popular support have been dissolved or disqualified. The result is not genuine multiparty competition, but a process with severe political and procedural shortcomings that cannot resolve the conflicts raging across Myanmar.

Beyond Myanmar’s borders, concerns exist over the military’s control of advance voting processes and the pressure that Myanmar migrant workers abroad may face through the restriction of embassy services or intimidation of family members. At the same time, overseas Myanmar nationals have also expressed deep scepticism and rejection of the elections, citing fears of coercion and misuse of consular services to compel participation. Their experiences echo domestic fears that advance and overseas voting under the military-appointed UEC lacks adequate safeguards and independent scrutiny, and may instead be used to produce favourable results for the junta.³⁸

In this context, the key question for regional organisations, neighbouring governments, and the wider international community is not how to assess the technical conduct of polling, but whether engagement with the junta’s electoral process risks lending it legitimacy despite its failure to meet international standards. ANFREL’s assessment calls on international actors to exercise caution, refrain from steps that could legitimise these sham elections, uphold the mandate of those elected in 2020 until genuine and transparent elections can be held, and support pro-democracy forces and civil society working toward an inclusive, democratic future for Myanmar.

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[1] ANFREL, Myanmar Junta’s Planned Elections: Falling Short of Democratic Legitimacy (Final Report, 29 Sept 2025); https://anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ANFREL_2025-Myanmar-Report_final_29-Sept-2025.pdf
[2] Ibid.
[3] DVB: https://www.facebook.com/100064451569209/posts/1291259383032435/
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Burma Affairs and Conflict Study (BACS), RESPECT Myanmar final report and media briefing, Dec 2025
[11] The Straits Times: Myanmar junta hunts 10 activists for anti-election protest; https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/myanmar-junta-hunts-10-for-anti-election-protest
[12] Burma Affairs and Conflict Study (BACS), RESPECT Myanmar final report and media briefing, Dec 2025; DVB: Myanmar’s ‘Election Protection Law’ prosecutes critics of regime-planned polls; https://english.dvb.no/myanmars-election-protection-law-prosecutes-critics-of-regime-planned-polls-audio/
[13] Burma Affairs and Conflict Study (BACS), RESPECT Myanmar final report and media briefing, Dec 2025.
[14] Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, Daily Briefing in Relation to the Military Coup, 15 Dec 2025, https://aappb.org/?p=35552
[15] The Straits Times: Myanmar junta hunts 10 activists for anti-election protest; https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/myanmar-junta-hunts-10-for-anti-election-protest
[16] ANFREL, Myanmar Junta’s Planned Elections: Falling Short of Democratic Legitimacy (Final Report, 29 Sept 2025); https://anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ANFREL_2025-Myanmar-Report_final_29-Sept-2025.pdf
[17] The Irrawaddy: Myanmar Junta’s Proxy Party Floods Election With Candidates, Dwarfing Rivals; https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/politics/myanmar-juntas-proxy-party-floods-election-with-candidates-dwarfing-rivals.html; ANFREL, Myanmar Junta’s Planned Elections: Falling Short of Democratic Legitimacy (Final Report, 29 Sept 2025); https://anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ANFREL_2025-Myanmar-Report_final_29-Sept-2025.pdf
[18] Ibid.
[19] The Irrawaddy: Myanmar Junta’s Proxy Party Floods Election With Candidates, Dwarfing Rivals; https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/politics/myanmar-juntas-proxy-party-floods-election-with-candidates-dwarfing-rivals.html
[20] The Irrawaddy: Myanmar Junta’s Proxy Party Floods Election With Candidates, Dwarfing Rivals; https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/politics/myanmar-juntas-proxy-party-floods-election-with-candidates-dwarfing-rivals.html; ANFREL, Myanmar Junta’s Planned Elections: Falling Short of Democratic Legitimacy (Final Report, 29 Sept 2025); https://anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ANFREL_2025-Myanmar-Report_final_29-Sept-2025.pdf
[21] Ibid.
[22] ANFREL, Myanmar Junta’s Planned Elections: Falling Short of Democratic Legitimacy (Final Report, 29 Sept 2025); https://anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ANFREL_2025-Myanmar-Report_final_29-Sept-2025.pdf
[23] Burma Affairs and Conflict Study (BACS), RESPECT Myanmar final report and media briefing, Dec 2025
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Eleven Myanmar: https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/41-of-50-overseas-voting-centers-complete-advance-voting-for-myanmar-citizens
[29] The Irrawaddy: Overseas Myanmar Voters Spurn Election Despite Junta Intimidation; https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/politics/overseas-myanmar-voters-spurn-election-despite-junta-intimidation.html
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Burma Affairs and Conflict Study (BACS), RESPECT Myanmar final report and media briefing, Dec 2025
[34] Ibid.
[35] CNI: ပြည်ပရောက် ကြိုတင်မဲ အခြေအနေ UEC ဘာပြောလဲ, https://cnimyanmar.com/index.php/political-2/politics-local/33245-uec-23
[36] Burma Affairs and Conflict Study (BACS), RESPECT Myanmar final report and media briefing, Dec 2025
[37] Burma Affairs and Conflict Study (BACS), RESPECT Myanmar final report and media briefing, Dec 2025; The Irrawaddy: Overseas Myanmar Voters Spurn Election Despite Junta Intimidation; https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/politics/overseas-myanmar-voters-spurn-election-despite-junta-intimidation.html

[38] ANFREL, Myanmar Junta’s Planned Elections: Falling Short of Democratic Legitimacy (Final Report, 29 Sept 2025); https://anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ANFREL_2025-Myanmar-Report_final_29-Sept-2025.pdf